Louisiana State University Law Center

LSU Law Digital Commons
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2022

Cross-Statute Employment Discrimination Claims and the Need
for a "Super Statute"
William R. Corbett
Louisiana State University Law Center, bill.corbett@law.lsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Corbett, William R., "Cross-Statute Employment Discrimination Claims and the Need for a "Super Statute""
(2022). Journal Articles. 455.
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship/455

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at LSU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of LSU Law Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Tue Oct 11 09:08:33 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.��
William R. Corbett, Cross-Statute Employment Discrimination Claims and the Need for a
"Super Statute", 99 Wash. U. L. REV. 1773 (2022).
ALWD 7th ed.
William R. Corbett, Cross-Statute Employment Discrimination Claims and the Need for a
"Super Statute", 99 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1773 (2022).
APA 7th ed.
Corbett, W. R. (2022). Cross-statute employment discrimination claims and the need
for "super statute". Washington University Law Review, 99(5), 1773-1806.
Chicago 17th ed.
William R. Corbett, "Cross-Statute Employment Discrimination Claims and the Need for
a "Super Statute"," Washington University Law Review 99, no. 5 (2022): 1773-1806
AGLC 4th ed.
William R. Corbett, 'Cross-Statute Employment Discrimination Claims and the Need for
a "Super Statute"' (2022) 99(5) Washington University Law Review 1773
OSCOLA 4th ed.
William R. Corbett, 'Cross-Statute Employment Discrimination Claims and the Need for
a "Super Statute"' (2022) 99 Wash U L Rev 1773
Provided by:
LSU Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

CROSS-STATUTE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AND THE NEED FOR
A "SUPER STATUTE"
WILLIAM R. CORBETT*

* 2021 Frank L. Maraist, Wex S. Malone & Rosemary Neal Hawkland Professor of Law, Paul M.
Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State University. I am grateful to Dean and Professor Emerita Rebecca

Hanner White, Professor Charles A. Sullivan, and Professor Sandra F. Sperino for helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this Article. I thank Madeleine Breaux, LSU Law Class of 2022, for her research
assistance.

1773

1774

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 99:1773

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1774
I. ASYMMETRY Six DECADES IN THE MAKING ..................................... 1778

A. Asymmetry Regarding Remedies .................................................. 1780
B. Asymmetry Regarding Causation Standards................................ 1783
C. Should Asymmetry Be a Cause for Concern?............................... 1785
II. PROBLEMS IN CROSS-STATUTE CLAIMS CREATED BY ASYMMETRICAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW ................................................... 1786

A. Comcast and Title VII/Section 1981 Claims.................................1786
1. The Comcast Decision...............................................................1786
2. Asymmetry Createdby Comcast Complicates Cross-Statute Claims
Under Title VII and Section 1981..................................................1788
B. The Frappied Decision and Intersectional Discrimination Claims
1795
1. The Frappied Decision...............................................................1795
2. Asymmetry Across Statutes CreatesProblemsfor Intersectional
1797
Discrimination Claims...................................................................
III. IT IS TIME FOR A SUPER STATUTE ...................................................
CONCLUSION..........................................................................................1806

1801

Congress has not draftedone statute to govern all claims of
employment discrimination, regardlessofwhether those claims arebased
upon any of the protectedclassificationsof race, sex, religion, national
origin, age, and disability. Thefactors which Plaintiffseeks to lump
together in this lawsuit under the title of "age-plus" theoriesof
discrimination are contained within fourseparate and distinct statutes: the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, andthe Rehabilitation Act.'
[Tihere is no super-statute to handle everyprotected classification
even though Congresscould have so amended Title VII if that was its
intention.2
INTRODUCTION

Imagine how an employment
decided in which a plaintiff
discrimination statutes asserting
national origin/age/disability. The
1.
2.

discrimination case would be tried and
sued under the federal employment
a claim on the intersectional basis of
plaintiff may claim, for example, that his

Luce v. Dalton, 166 F.R.D. 457, 461 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 167 F.R.D. 88 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
Johnson v. Napolitano, No. 10 Civ. 8545, 2013 WL 1285164, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013).
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employer discriminated against him by regarding him as a "crazy, old
Russian." 3 The plaintiff would assert the claim under three separate statutes:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)4; the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 5; and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 6 Courts often characterize as "plus
claims" those claims in which the alleged basis for discrimination is a
covered characteristic and an uncovered characteristic, such as sex-plusfamily-responsibility, or two covered characteristics, such as sex-plus-age. 7
The asymmetries of federal employment discrimination law, with several
separate discrimination statutes covering different characteristics and
applying different legal principles, create theoretical and practical
conundrums. These problems are particularly evident and vexatious in
discrimination claims that cross over statutes.
So, what is the standard of causation applicable to a cross-statute claim?'
This is not simply an interesting theoretical question. Knowing the
applicable standard of causation is crucial to a court's deciding of
dispositive motions, such as failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law.9
Discerning the appropriate causation standard may also be essential to
drafting jury instructions.' 0 Another crucial issue is determining the types
of remedies available to a plaintiff who prevails on such a cross-statute
claim." For example, in the hypothetical above, the remedies available for
national origin discrimination under Title VII and disability discrimination
under the ADA differ from the remedies available for age discrimination
3.

This is not merely a hypothetical for a law school exam. A plaintiff asserted such a claim in

Chaikin v. Methodist Med. Ctr., No. 18-CV-1208, 2018 WL 4643016, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2018).
4.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
5.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634).
6.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
7.
See, e.g., Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1045-48 (10th Cir.
2020). See generally Rebecca Hanner White, Aging on Air: Sex, Age, and Television News, 50 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1323, 1331-38 (2020).
As will be discussed below, different standards of causation apply under different
8.
employment discrimination statutes. See infra Section l.B.
9.
It is in analyzing these motions that courts heavily rely on the proof frameworks, which
incorporate standards of causation. Cf Robert G. Schwemm, FairHousing and the CausationStandard
After Comcast, 66 VILL. L. REV. 63, 102-07 (2021) (stating the role of standards of causation in Fair
Housing Act claims); see also Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking DiscriminationLaw, 110 MICH. L. REV.

69, 113-14 (2011).
10.

Juries must be instructed whether the applicable standard is but-for or motivating factor. See,

e.g., Murray v. Mayo Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2720
(2020); Guerra v. North East Indep. Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2007); Michael J. Zimmer,
A Chain ofInferences ProvingDiscrimination,79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1243, 1293-94 (2008).
11. See infra Section I.A.
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under the ADEA. Thus, if the claim is characterized as a national originplus claim under Title VII or a disability-plus claim under the ADA, the
plaintiff may recover one set of remedies. On the other hand, if it is deemed
an age-plus claim under the ADEA, the plaintiff may recover a different set
of remedies.
Turning to a more common scenario, suppose a plaintiff sues for race
discrimination under both Title VII and section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 (section 1981).12 Most plaintiffs who sue for race discrimination
sue under both statutes. 13 The assertion of claims under those two statutes
posed no significant problems until the Supreme Court recently declared
that the statutes have different standards of causation.' 4 Now, a plaintiff
suing for race discrimination must prove such discrimination was a
motivating factor of the adverse employment action to recover under Title
VII and a but-for cause to recover under section 1981.
The federal employment discrimination law of the United States presents
several salient problems because it is principally composed of four separate
statutes,15 and Congress and the Supreme Court have developed
asymmetrical law in and under the statutes. Two recent court decisions
highlight the difficulties posed by having asymmetrical employment
discrimination law when it is applied to cross-statute discrimination claims.
In Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned
Media, 16 the United States Supreme Court held that but-for causation is the
standard of causation applicable to section 1981.17 In Frappied v. Affinity
Gaming Black Hawk, L.L.C.,18 the Tenth Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to hold that a cross-statute discrimination claim (in this case,
sex-plus-age) is cognizable under Title VII.1 9 The situations posed by the
42 U.S.C. § 1981.
12.
See, e.g., Danielle Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and
13.
Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 190 (2006)
(stating that "[c]ivil rights plaintiffs most frequently invoke [section 1981] in conjunction with Title VII
claims for workplace race discrimination").

14.
Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
15.
I am not including the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), which Congress
enacted in 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.). The volume of charges filed under GINA has been small, and there are few
reported cases discussing the Act. Regarding number of charges filed, see EEOC, Charge Statistics

(Charges filed with the EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2020, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/chargestatistics-charges-filed-ecoc-fy-1997-through-fy-2020 [https://perma.cc/WBP4-BHC5]. However, the
number of charges did surge from 209 in 2019 to 440 in 2020. Id.
140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
16.
17.
Id. at 1019.
966 F.3d 1038 (2020).
18.
See id. at 1047-48 (stating that no federal appellate court has recognized a claim for
19.
intersectional discrimination across statutes and holding, consistent with the decisions of several federal
district courts and the position of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, that such claims are

cognizable).
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two decisions are different because Frappieddealt with an intersectional or
hybrid discrimination claim that combined covered characteristics (sex and
age), while Comcast dealt with a race discrimination claim, which can be
asserted under section 1981 and/or Title VII. 20 However, the decisions share
common ground in highlighting problems that arise in cross-statute
employment discrimination claims due to the different law applicable to
each statute.
In this Article, I assess the problems in cross-statute employment
discrimination claims that are a product of the asymmetry of the federal
employment discrimination law. I have addressed in prior work the problem
of differing standards of causation and proof frameworks. 2 1 However, the
cross-statute claims in Comcast and Frappieddemonstrate the theoretical
incoherence and practical problems spawned when claims are based on
different statutes that have different causation standards, remedies, and
other provisions. Changes are essential to enable lawyers to litigate and
judges and juries to resolve employment discrimination cases. Moreover,
the general public needs to have some understanding of the law and a belief
that it is fair. 22
Effective and appropriate resolution of these problems likely outstrips
the Supreme Court's ability and will. Thus, it is incumbent on Congress to
solve these problems. However, Congress's approach in the past, amending
the separate employment discrimination statutes to achieve as much
uniformity as policy choices permit, is not a good approach. There is a
danger that such an approach produces uncertainty regarding congressional
intent and preserves old (or produces new) asymmetry. The Civil Rights Act
of 1991,23 which was Congress's most substantial overhaul of the
employment discrimination statutes, produced considerable asymmetry as
the Supreme Court interpreted it.24 The better approach would be for
Congress to repeal the various laws and replace them with a consolidated
one court termed a "super
employment discrimination law 25-what

20.
Comcast was not an employment discrimination claim, but section 1981 does cover
employment discrimination claims based on race. See infra text accompanying notes 48-57.
21.
See William R. Corbett, IntolerableAsymmetry and Uncertainty:Congress Should Right the
Wrongs ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1991, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 419 (2021) [hereinafter Corbett, Intolerable
Asymmetry].
Borrowing from George Orwell, people may wonder why all people covered by employment
22.
discrimination laws are equal, but some are more equal than others. See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL

FARM 112 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1946) (containing the memorable and oft-quoted line: "All animals
are equal, but some are more equal than others").

23.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
See Corbett, IntolerableAsymmetry, supra note 21.
24.
25.
William R. Corbett, Callingon Congress: Take a Pagefrom Parliament'sPlaybookandFix
Employment DiscriminationLaw, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135 (2013) [hereinafter Corbett, Calling
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statute."26 That single statute should achieve uniformity on most issues
across protected characteristics; however, complete uniformity is not
essential in a consolidated statute. Should Congress wish to make
distinctions among some characteristics on some issues, Congress could
specify such issues and make its intent clear in the single statute. The
government of the United Kingdom engaged in such a project in enacting
the Equality Act of 2010.27 Ironically, at almost sixty years into the initiative
by Congress and the courts to eradicate employment discrimination, the
United States, whose laws established the model for the UK's employment
discrimination laws,28 has not taken such a step. Consolidating the various
statutes into one is not easy work, and the process will be fraught with
controversy. Nonetheless, the time is long past due for the former world
leader in employment discrimination law to update its law and create a
coherent super-statute within an overall plan.
Part II of this Article examines the asymmetry that has developed in
federal employment discrimination law in the enactment and interpretation
of several separate statutes. PartIII considers significant practical problems
created by the asymmetry. Part IV proposes a solution-the creation of a
more symmetrical law by the enactment of a single consolidated
employment discrimination statute.
I. ASYMMETRY

SIX DECADES IN THE MAKING

The occurrence or phenomenon of discrimination is a complex matter. 29
Illegal employment discrimination involves treating one employee
30
differently than others based on a characteristic that the law protects.
Unsurprisingly, crafting law to address employment discrimination is very

on Congress]; William R. Corbett, What is Troubling About the "Tortification" of Employment
Discrimination Law?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027 (2014).
Johnson v. Napolitano, No. 10 Civ. 8545, 2013 WL 1285164, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013).
26.
27.
Equality Act 2010,
c. 15
(UK) [hereinafter Equality Act of 2010],
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents [https://perma.cc/D3HX-L7S3].
Steven L. Willborn, Theories ofEmployment Discrimination in the United Kingdom and the
28.

United States, 9 B.C. INT'L &COMPAR. L. REV. 243, 244 (1986) ("While the roots of U.S. law are found
in English legal history, the roots of British discrimination law are found in recent U.S. legal history.");

Shari Engels, Comment, Problems of Proofin Employment Discrimination: The Need for a Clearer
Definition of Standards in the United States and the United Kingdom, 15 COMPAR. LAB. L.J. 340, 341

(1994) (stating that Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the model for the United Kingdom's Race Relations
Act).
See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Markets and Discrimination, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 691 (2007)
29.
(stating that "employment discrimination is an enormously complex phenomenon").

30.

See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020) (explaining that

discrimination in 1964 and today means treating an individual worse than others who arc similarly

situated).
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challenging. 3 ' As many commentators have explained, the law developed in
the United States over almost six decades to address invidious employment
discrimination fits poorly with the way discrimination actually occurs in the
workplace. 3 2
Congress embarked on the mission of enacting laws to redress
employment discrimination with the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.33 In the ensuing years, Congress covered additional
characteristics with the passage of the ADEA in 1967,34 the ADA in 1990,35
and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008.36 Congress
also has amended the employment discrimination laws many times in an
effort to keep pace with the doctrinal developments by the Supreme Court. 37
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts, for their part, have developed
an elaborate structure for proving employment discrimination based on two
general theories of discrimination and the associated proof frameworks. 38 In
developing and explaining these theories and frameworks, the courts have

31.
One experienced attorney who regularly argues cases before the Supreme Court expressed
this idea well: "I will say in 25 years of advocacy before this Court I have not seen one area of the law
that seems to me as difficult to sort out as this particular one is." Transcript of Oral Argument at 29,

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (No. 08-441) (statement by Carter G. Phillips,
arguing for respondent) https://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument_transcripts/2008/08-

441.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A4G-VDH9].
32.
The literature is voluminous. Professor Krieger explained that much discrimination results
from subconscious cognitive functioning involving routine categorization rather than malevolent
conscious motivation. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
Professor Paul Gudel argued that the concept of causation-on which proof of employment
discrimination is based-is ill-suited to linking the mental process of discrimination with the adverse
employment actions. Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed

Motives Problem in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 70 TEX. L. REv. 17, 88-92 (1991); Robin
Dembroff, Issa Kohler-Hausmann & Elise Sugarman, What Taylor Swift and Beyonce Teach Us About
Sex and Causes, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2020-21).

33 . Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
34. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634).
35. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
36.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.).
37.
Among the amendments have been the following: the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
amending Title VII, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012));
the amendment to add the definition of religion to Title VII, including non-accommodation, Act of Mar.

24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012)); the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.); the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)); and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
38.
See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Justice Kennedy's Big New Idea, 96 B.U. L. REv. 1789, 1790
(2016).
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borrowed liberally from tort law, including standards of causation. 39 The
courts have clung tenaciously to the doctrinal structures notwithstanding the
many criticisms directed at them.
A. Asymmetry RegardingRemedies
Asymmetry between the statutes and among the covered characteristics
significantly expanded 40 with Congress's decision not to include age as a
protected characteristic under Title VII but instead, to direct the Secretary
of Labor to study the need for such law.4 1 After Secretary Wirtz delivered
his report in 1965,42 Congress proceeded to enact the ADEA in 1967.
Although the prohibition on discrimination in the ADEA generally mirrors
the language of Title VII, there are a few textual differences between the
ADEA and Title VII. In particular, two differences present fundamental
problems in Title VII-ADEA intersectional claims-remedies and standards
of causation. The remedies asymmetry was created by Congress when it
enacted the ADEA and incorporated the remedial provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, rather than those of Title VII. 43 Thus, under the ADEA
the remedies available are: equitable relief,44 including unpaid amounts due,
and liquidated damages in cases of willful violations. 45 In contrast, Title VII,
46
as enacted in 1964, provided for only equitable relief, including backpay.
For a period of time, this distinction in remedies also resulted in an
39.
See generally Martha Chamallas & Sandra F. Sperino, Symposium, Torts and Civil Rights
Law: Migration and Conflict: Symposium Introduction, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1021 (2014); Charles A.
Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012); Sandra F. Sperino,
DiscriminationStatutes, The Common Law, and ProximateCause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Sandra F.
Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014).
There already was some asymmetry within Title VII among the protected characteristics. For
40.
example, the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense applies to sex, religion, and national

origin but not race and color. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(e)(1).

Congress considered a BFOQ defense for race

but rejected the idea. See 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964) (statement of Sens. Clark & Case); Paul Frymer

& John D. Skrentny, The Rise ofInstrumentalAffirmative Action: Law and the New SignificanceofRace
in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 686-87 (2004).
41.

See Victoria A. Lipnic, The State ofAge Discriminationand Older Workers in the U.S. 50

Years After the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N (June 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/reports/state-age-discrimination-and-older-workers-us-50years-after-age-discrimination-employment, [https://perma.cc/T354-BCT7].
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
42.
EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964 (1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT], reprinted in EEOC, The Older American Worker-Age
https://www.eeoc.gov/reports/older-american-worker-ageEmployment,
in
Discrimination

discrimination-employment [https://perma.cc/UMU3-JP36].
43.
29 U.S.C. § 626.
The statute provides for "equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of
44.
this [Act], including ... judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion .... " 29 U.S.C.

§ 626(b).
45.
46.

Id.
42 U.S.C

§ 2000e-5(g).
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additional significant distinction between Title VII and the ADEA-jury
trials were available under the ADEA but not under Title VII. Congress
eliminated the right-to-a-jury-trial distinction when the Civil Rights Act of
199147 amended Title VII (and the ADA) to make available compensatory
and punitive damages, capped according to the employer's number of
employees. 48 Although the 1991 Act made capped damages available under
Title VII, the remedies available under Title VII and the ADEA remain
different.
Another important asymmetry regarding remedies under the
employment discrimination statutes flows from the case law holding that
employment discrimination claims based on race can be pursued under not
only Title VII but also under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.49
Section 1981 is part of the Reconstruction era civil rights law intended to
secure the rights of former slaves regarding several matters, including their
ability to enter into contracts. 50 Section 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons .
. shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, [and] give evidence . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." 5' The
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as providing a civil remedy of
equitable and legal relief, including compensatory damages, and in some
circumstances, punitive damages.52 There are no caps on these damages. It
is worth noting that many employment discrimination claims can be
plausibly asserted under section 1981 because the Supreme Court has
broadly interpreted the definition of race. In the leading Supreme Court
decision on point, the Court held that a plaintiff who claimed to be
discriminated against because of his Arab ancestry could assert a race
discrimination claim under section 1981 in St. Francis College v. AlKhazraji.53 The Court reasoned that Congress "intended to protect from
discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to

47.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
48.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b).
49.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
"Sections 1981 and 1983 are parts of the Civil Rights Acts that were enacted after the Civil
50.
War to 'give force and effect to the newly ratified Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments."'

Kelly Koenig Levi, Allowing a Title VII Punitive Damage Award Without an Accompanying
Compensatoryor NominalAward: FurtherUnifying the FederalCivilRights Law, 89 KY. L.J. 581, 589
(2001) (quoting BARBARA LtNDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 668 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Tarantolo, supranote 13, at 185-88 (discussing the history of section

1981).
42 U.S.C. § 1981.
51.
52.
See Johnson 421 U.S. at 459-60; Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
481 U.S. 604 (1987). See also Abdullahi v. Prada USA Corp., 520 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir.
53.
2008) (stating that a "loose sense" of race "is the right one to impute to a race statute passed in 1866").
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intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics."54
Congress has long been aware of the availability of remedies for racial
discrimination in employment under both Title VII and section 1981, and it
has preserved the dual remedies; specifically, when debating the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress considered and rejected an
amendment that would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for race
discrimination in employment. 5 Thus, race claims have been different
from, and treated more favorably than, Title VII claims for sex, national
origin, or religion discrimination because of the availability of uncapped
damages under section 1981. Additionally, as with age claims, race
discrimination plaintiffs had a right to jury trial because of the availability
of legal damages. 56 With the remedies available under section 1981, race
discrimination plaintiffs could forego Title VII claims and sue under only
section 1981,5 unless they wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to
have the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) attempt to
resolve the Title VII case. 58
With the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress put sex,
religion, national origin, and disability discrimination claims on closer to
60
even footing with race discrimination claims 59 by enacting section 1981 a,
a new statute which made compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
jury trials, available under each. 6' However, a political compromise to
secure passage of the 1991 Act preserved a distinction in remedies under
section 1981 and Title VII by instituting damages caps on the aggregate of
62
compensatory and punitive damages based on the number of employees,
54.

Al Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613. See, e.g., Sinai v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 F.3d 471 (1st

Cir. 1993) (race discrimination claim under section 1981 based on Jewish/Hebrew race), cert. denied,

513 U.S. 1025 (1994).
55.

See, e.g., Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The Court at the Crossroads:

Runyon, Section 1981 and the Meaning of Precedent, 37 EMORY L.J. 949, 973-74 (1988) (recounting
Senate debate over the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,

491 U.S. 164, 201-03 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 240 (1992).
56.
Cf DuBose v. Boeing Co., 905 F. Supp. 953, 960 (D. Kan. 1995) (stating that "[a]s a practical
57.
matter [Title VII] adds nothing to the recovery by plaintiff under § 1981").
The EEOC does not have jurisdiction over section 1981 claims. For charges received under
58.
Title VII, the EEOC has statutory duties to investigate and attemptto resolve cases by informal methods,

such as conciliation. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(b).

The Sponsors' Interpretative Memorandum states that the purpose of amending Title VII by
59.
§ 1981 a(a)(1) was to allow victims of intentional sex or religious discrimination to recover compensatory
and punitive damages which already were permitted for victims of racial or ethnic discrimination under

§ 1981.
60.
61.
62.

137 Cong. Rec. S15, 483-84 (1991).
42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
See M. Isabel Medina, A Matter ofFact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments, 8

S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 311, 312 n.8 (1999) (citing 137 Cong. Rec. S15020 (daily ed. Oct.
22, 1991) (remarks of Senator DeConcini)); Michael C. Harper, Eliminating the Needfor Capson Title
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with the highest cap being $300,000 for employers with more than 500
employees. 63 Consequently, plaintiffs asserting race discrimination claims
still frequently assert their claims under both section 1981 and Title VII
because of the uncapped damages available under section 1981.
Additionally, section 1981a includes limiting language which states that a
plaintiff cannot recover damages under section 1981a if damages are
available under section 1981: capped damages are available "provided that
the complaining party cannot recover under section 1981 of this title [42
U.S.C. 1981]."64 Presumably, this language was intended to obviate the
possibility of a double recovery of damages under section 1981 and section
1981a. 65 After Comcast, however, the limiting language may provide an
avenue for race discrimination plaintiffs to forego their section 1981 claims
and instead seek damages under section 1981 a.66
B. Asymmetry RegardingCausationStandards
The second significant asymmetry among the federal employment
discrimination statutes is the different causation standards applicable under
different statutes. This asymmetry began with the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and the Supreme Court's interpretations of that law. 67
Congress amended Title VII to add a statutory mixed-motives analysis to
replace the framework developed by the Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.68 For the first part of the two-part framework,
Congress inserted a "motivating factor" standard in Title VII,6 9 opting for

VIIDamage Awards: The Shieldof Kolstadv. American Dental Association, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 477, 483 (2011). The earlier iteration of the 1991 Act, the failed Civil Rights Act of 1990, did
not cap damages in section 1981 a. See, e.g., Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Twenty Years of Compromise: How

&

the Caps on Damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Codified Sex Discrimination,25 YALE J.L.
FEMINISM 249 (2014).
See 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(2). Over the years since the enactment of the 1991 Act, bills have
63.
been introduced that would remove the caps, but they have not been enacted. See, e.g., Equal Remedies

Act of 2007, S. 1928, 110th Cong. (2007-08).
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1)-(2).
64.
See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 870 F. Supp. 406, 407 (D. Me. 1994).
65.
See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
66.
See generally, Corbett, IntolerableAsymmetry, supranote 21.
67.
68. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the Court announced the mixed-motives
framework for analysis of individual disparate treatment claims. Under this two-stage framework, the
plaintiff established a prima facie case by proving that sex was a motivating or substantial factor (the

plurality and Justice O'Connor, concurring, disagreed as to which standard applied) in the employer's
decision. If the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant
employer to establish the same-decision defense-that it would have made the same decision for a
nondiscriminatory reason. If the employer satisfied the affirmative defense, it avoided liability. The
Price Waterhouse mixed-motives framework was adapted from an analysis developed for constitutional

claims in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
69.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
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the standard articulated by the plurality in Price Waterhouse7 0 rather than
the "substantial factor" standard favored by Justice O'Connor in her
concurrence.71 The Supreme Court later described "motivating factor" as a
"more forgiving" 72 or "relaxe[d]" 73 standard compared with the but-for
causation standard which the Court gleaned from the original "because of'
language. In 2009, the Supreme Court in Gross v. FBL FinancialServices,
Inc.74 held that the "motivating factor" standard of causation and the mixedmotives proof framework do not apply to age discrimination claims under
the ADEA. The Court reasoned that Congress in the 1991 Act amended
Title VII to add the "motivating factor" standard of causation and the mixedmotives analysis, but it did not similarly amend the ADEA. 75 When
Congress amends one statute but not another, "it is presumed to have acted
intentionally." 76 The Court noted that the only standard of causation in the
ADEA is the original "because of' language, 77 which the Court interpreted
as necessarily meaning but-for causation. 78 The Court extended its holding
in Gross to retaliation claims under Title VII in University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, requiring proof of but-for
causation because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 similarly did not amend the
retaliation provision of Title VII to include "motivating factor."
The standard of causation under the ADA is unclear. Although the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 provides the same capped compensatory and punitive
damages for both Title VII and the ADA, the 1991 Act did not amend the
ADA to provide for a mixed-motives causation standard as it did with Title
VII. After Gross and Nassar,it seems likely that the Court will interpret the
"because of' language in the ADA as requiring but-for causation. However,
the ADA Amendments Act of 200880 amended the ADA to change the
language from "because of' to "on the basis of." 8 ' Although a majority of
federal courts that have considered the issue have held that Gross controls
and the standard of causation under the ADA is but-for, there is a division

Price Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 244, 249.
Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
72.
See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020).
73.
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 773 (2015); Univ. of Tx. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 349 (2013).
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
74.
Id. at 174-75.
75.
Id. at 174.
76.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
77.
Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.
78.
79.
570 U.S. 338 (2013).
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101
80.
(2012)).
42 U.S.C. §12112(a).
81.
70.
71.
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of authority.8 2 The Supreme Court declined to resolve the issue in Murray
v. Mayo Clinic.83 Still, the Supreme Court's discrimination but-for causation
trilogy of Gross/Nassar/Comcastportends extension of but-for causation to
the ADA. 84
C. ShouldAsymmetry Be a Causefor Concern?
These differences in remedies and standards of causation are not the only
differences among the statutes or even among the several covered
characteristics within Title VII. For example, the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) defense 5 is an affirmative defense to discrimination
based on sex, religion, national origin, 86 and age, 87 but not race, color, and
disability. Reverse discrimination claims are permitted under Title VII,88
but not under the ADEA 89 and the ADA. 90 Disparate impact claims are
cognizable under all employment discrimination statutes, 91 but not under
section 1981.92 Failure-to-make-reasonable-accommodation claims are
available for only discrimination based on religion under Title VII,93
disability discrimination under the ADA, 94 and in an indirect way pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII. 95 Jury trials are available in all cases under
82.
See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying "butfor" causation to ADA claims in light ofGross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)); Lewis v.
Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (same); Gentry v. East West Partners
Club Management Co., 816 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2016) (joining 6th and 7th Circuits in applying but-for
causation). But see Hoffman v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 597 F. App'x 231 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying
"motivating factor"); Siring v. Or. State Bd. Higher Educ., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Or. 2013) (applying
"motivating factor"). Siring apparently was overruled by the Ninth Circuit's holding that but-for
causation applies under the ADA in Murray v. Mayo Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 2720 (2020). The Fifth Circuit's holding in Hoffman was questioned by a federal district court
in the Fifth Circuit in Burns v. Nielsen, 506 F. Supp. 3d 448 (W.D. Tex. 2020).
83.
Murray, 934 F.3d 1101, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2729.
84.
Civil Rights Act of 1866-AntidiscriminationLaw-PleadingStandards-ComcastCorp. v.
National Ass'n of African American-Owned Media, 134 HARV. L. REv. 580, 588-89 (2020).
Under the bona fide occupational defense, the defendant admits to discriminating based on
85.
sex, national origin, religion, or age, but argues that an employee's not having that particular
characteristic is "reasonably necessary" to successful performance of the job. See, e.g., Dothard v.

Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding as a BFOQ Alabama prison rule that prison guards must be
of the same sex as the inmates they guard).

86.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
29 U.S.C. § § 623(f)(1).
87.
88.
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
89.
90.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(g).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) & (k) (Title vII); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(2) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. §
91.
12112(b)(6) (ADA).
92.
Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
93.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a).
94.
95.
Title VII does not expressly impose a duty to make reasonable accommodations for
pregnancy, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(k), but the Supreme Court has held that pregnancy discrimination
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section 1981,96 in both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims
under the ADEA, 97 and in only disparate treatment cases under Title VII
and the ADA. 98
I do not suggest that employment discrimination law must be uniform in
every facet. Nonetheless, it should be a source of concern to policymakers,
judges, and lawyers that the employment discrimination statutes are
asymmetrical regarding remedies and standards of causation. Cross-statute
claims, such as race claims asserted under both Title VII and section 1981,
and so-called intersectional claims, such as sex-and-age claims under Title
VII and the ADEA, illustrate the practical quandaries posed by these
asymmetries. Two cases in particular demonstrate these issues and the
corresponding great need for a super-statute.
II. PROBLEMS IN CROSS-STATUTE CLAIMS CREATED BY ASYMMETRICAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

A. Comcast and Title VI/Section 1981 Claims
1. The Comcast Decision
Comcast involved a claim of discrimination in contracting-not an
employment discrimination claim-under section 1981. The plaintiff ESN
sued Comcast after negotiations between the two media companies did not
result in an agreement. The plaintiff, an African American entrepreneur,
owned ESN, which was comprised of seven television networks. Comcast,
a television network conglomerate, and ESN could not come to an
agreement for Comcast to carry the ESN networks. ESN sued Comcast
under section 1981, claiming race discrimination, and Comcast argued that
99
its viewers preferred a different type of programming not offered by ESN.
The district court granted a 12(b)(6) motion, dismissing the action and
00
holding that ESN had not plausibly pled but-for causation based on race.'
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court applied the wrong
standard of causation to a section 1981 claim, and instead it should have
applied the standard that race "played some role" in the decision."0 ' The

plaintiffs, under some circumstances, may recover for failure to make reasonable accommodations.

Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015).
See, e.g., Bibbs v. Jim Lynch Cadillac, Inc., 653 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1981) (collecting
96.
cases).

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2).
42 U.S.C. §1981a(c).
Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013 (2020).
Id.
Id.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding
that the trial court applied the correct standard of but-for causation.102
The Court began its analysis by observing that the default standard of
causation, derived from tort law, is but-for causation.1 03 Section 1981 is
silent regarding standards of causation, but the Court found nothing in the
statute's text, history, or Court precedent to persuade it that section 1981
presented an exception to what the Court views as the default rule for
statutory torts.1 04 The Court further rejected the plaintiffs invitation to
import the "motivating factor" standard from Title VII into section 1981.105
First, the Court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins1 06 because Congress superseded that decision with a statutory
version of the motivating factor standard in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.107
Congress in the 1991 Act amended Title VII to insert the motivating factor
standard into that statute. Although the 1991 Act also amended section
1981, the Act did not correspondingly insert the motivating factor standard
into that statute.' 08 Thus, employing the statutory interpretation tool invoked
in Gross and Nassar, the Court reasoned that when Congress
simultaneously amends one statute in one way and another in another way,
the difference in language implies a difference in meaning.1 09 The Court
also rejected the argument that the statutory language "make and enforce
contracts" requires a motivating factor standard because it includes claims
for contract process as well as contract outcomes." 0 The Court explained
that it did not need to resolve whether section 1981 covers process claims
because it did not find that "motivating factor" is necessarily the appropriate
standard for process-based claims."1
The Court's decision in Comcast is not surprising. As the Court stated in
Comcast, it presumes Congress legislates against a default or background
common law rule of but-for causation, and the Court consistently applies
that presumption to employment discrimination statutes." 2 Ironically,
during the same term that it decided Comcast, the Court held in Babb v.
Wilkie" 3 that Congress intended to create a different standard of causation
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1014.
Id.
Id. at 1017-18.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1017.
Id. at 1017-18.
Id. at 1018.
Id.

112.

See id. at 1014. The Court reasoned that Congress expressly adopted the common law in the

Id.

Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the tort law of that period generally required but-for causation, although
there were exceptions. Id. at 1016.

113.

140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020).
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in the federal sector provision of the ADEA, but that was based on statutory
language that could not be reconciled with the default standard. In contrast,
the Comcast Court found nothing in the statutory text, its history, or Court
precedent that persuaded it to vary from the default rule." 4 Although the
Comcast holding is consistent with Court precedent regarding the default
rule, the Court could have and should have identified a good reason to depart
from its default rule, since the statutory language of section 1981 certainly
does not requirethe Court to interpret it as requiring but-for causation. Even
though Comcastwas not a section 1981 employment discrimination claim,
the Court certainly is aware that many section 1981 claims are employment
discrimination claims. The vexatious asymmetry the decision portends in
employment discrimination law should have provided the Court with a good
reason to depart from the default rule.
2. Asymmetry Createdby Comcast Complicates Cross-Statute Claims
Under Title VII and Section 1981
After Comcast, race discrimination claims present a number of issues
based on the asymmetry that now exists between Title VII and section 1981.
The overarching asymmetry is that race claims, despite being based on the
same set of facts, have different standards of causation under the two
statutes. Commentators predicted this problem would arise after the Court's
decision in Gross.1 5 A plaintiff pursuing a race discrimination claim under
Title VII and section 1981 may survive dispositive motions and may win by
satisfying the relaxed or "more forgiving" motivating factor causation
standard for the Title VII claim. However, to survive and win under section
1981, the plaintiff must satisfy the more demanding but-for causation
standard. Should we be concerned about this asymmetry? It is worth
considering some ramifications. 1 6
The first issue is how courts will analyze intentional discrimination
claims under Title VII and section 1981. Differently stated, the question is
which proof framework, mixed-motives or pretext, if either, applies under
each statute. The Court's decision that there is a different standard of
causation under section 1981 than there is under Title VII is a significant
change in the law. Before Comcast,courts did not conduct separate analyses
under the two statutes, 17 meaning that if a court analyzed the plaintiff's
114.

Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1014.

115.

See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining CongressionalOverrides: The Hydra Problem

in Statutory Interpretation,90 TEX. L. REv. 859, 916-17 (2012).
116. These observations are based on a small sample size, as only a handful of courts of appeals
and several district courts have explored the ramifications of Comcast.

117. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989); Humphries v.
CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 403-04 (7th Cir. 2007).
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Title VII race claim under the McDonnellDouglaspretext framework, it did
the same with the section 1981 claim." 8 Thus, a single analysis determined
liability or nonliability under the two statutes, and the principal function of
section 1981, after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, was
simply to add an uncapped damages component to the Title VII claim. 1 9
After the Court's Comcast decision, the single uniform analysis of race
claims under Title VII and section 1981 must change.
Courts recognize that different causation standards apply under Title VII
and section 1981, but some courts do not seem to fully engage with the idea
that the different causation standards will require different proof
frameworks. The Supreme Court and other courts have assumed that the
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework measures but-for causation,' 2 0
although the Comcast decision may have called that interpretation into
question.121 The statutory mixed-motives framework installed in Title VII
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 begins with motivating factor. So, a plaintiff
should be able to insist that her Title VII claim be evaluated under the less
rigorous statutory mixed-motives analysis, although the section 1981 claim
almost certainly will be evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas pretext
framework. However, the Court's dicta in Comcast left uncertain whether
the McDonnell Douglasanalysis continues to apply to section 1981 claims:
"Whether or not McDonnellDouglashas some useful role to play in § 1981
cases, it does not mention the motivating factor test, let alone endorse its
use only at the pleadings stage." 22 Several post-Comcast decisions assert
that Comcast did nothing to change the applicability of the McDonnell
Douglas framework to section 1981 claims.1 2 3 Other courts have been less
118. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Bratton v. Roadway Package
Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 176 (7th Cir. 1996); Tarantolo, supra note 13, at 190.
119. There are other differences that may make pursuing claims under section 1981 advantageous,
such as no requirement to exhaust administrative remedies, a longer statute of limitations, and no
minimum number of employees for an employer to be covered. Tarantolo, supranote 13, at 191. Also,

most courts considering the issue have held that individual liability may be imposed under section 1981,
whereas liability under Title VII may be imposed on only those who satisfy the definition of"employer."
See, e.g., Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing circuit and
district court decisions so holding); James v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 296, 318
(E.D.N.Y. 2012).
120. See, e.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282 n.10; Foster v. Univ. of Md.-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d
243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015).
121. Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020) (stating
"[b]ecause McDonnellDouglas arose in a context where but-for causation was the undisputed test, it did
not address causation standards").

122. Id. This is the same kind of ambiguity the Court has engaged in regarding whether the
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis applies to age discrimination claims. Gross v. FBL Financial
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 n.2 (2009) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133 (2000); O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)).
123. See, e.g., Mann v. XPO Logistics Freight, Inc., 819 F. App'x 585, 594 n.15 (10th Cir. 2020);
Gary v. Facebook, Inc., 822 F. App'x 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2020); Gipson Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v.
U.A. Local 572, No. 3:18-cv-00768, 2021 WL 4909726 at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 21, 2021); Jacquett v.
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certain about application of McDonnell Douglaspretext analysis to section
1981124 or interpreted the Comcast dicta as changing the law.12 In some
post-Comcast decisions, courts, striving to maintain a uniform analysis of
race claims under Title VII and section 1981, have analyzed both claims
under the more stringent McDonnell Douglas framework,1 26 although this
approach ignores the applicability of the mixed-motives framework to race
claims under Title VII.
Perhaps the best demonstration of the confusion wrought by Comcast is
Kilgore v. FedEx Freight,121 in which the district court considered a
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim of race
discrimination under both Title VII and section 1981. The court explained
that different standards of causation now apply to the two statutes after
Comcast-motivating factor for Title VII and but-for for section 1981.128
Despite this difference, the court then brought some uniformity to the
question by saying that the standard for summary judgment is the samewhether the evidence would permit a reasonable juror to find that the
plaintiff suffered an adverse job action because of race.1 29 Alas, the court
then proceeded to apply the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis to the
issue, making no distinction between the Title VII and section 1981
claims.130
Another unusual interpretation of the ramification of the Comcast
decision on use of the McDonnellDouglas analysis for section 1981 claims
is that of the federal district court in Balkiewicz v. Wawa, Inc.131 The
plaintiff in that case asserted a race discrimination claim under only section
1981. The court explained that after Comcast, a plaintiff asserting a claim
under section 1981 may use the McDonnell Douglas framework but
additionally must prove that race was a but-for cause of the adverse

Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Okla. Corp. Comm'n, No. Civ.-17-01133, 2021 WL 5989785 (W.D. Okla. Feb.
17, 2021).
124. "It is unclear whether McDonnell Douglashas a role to play in analyzing evidence in § 1981
claims, but the United States Supreme Court appears to sanction its use as 'a tool for assessing claims,

typically at the summary judgment stage."' Kingori v. Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 18-340-JJM-LDA,
2020 WL 5517643, at *3 n.5 (D.R.l Sept. 14, 2020) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n Afr. Am.Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020)).
125. See McKenzie-El v. Am. Sugar Refinery, Inc., No. RDB-20-0917, 2020 WL 7489021, at *8
the Supreme Court clarified that
(D. Md. Dec. 21, 2020) (noting that "in Comcast Corporation ...
McDonnell Douglas does not address the causation standard relevant for claims of discrimination

brought under Section 1981").
126. See, e.g., Mann, 819 F. App'x at 594; Stovall v. ASRC Energy Servs.-Houston Contracting
Co., No. 3:18-cv-00259-TMB, 2021 WL 3361680, at *7 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 2021).
127. 458 F. Supp. 3d 973 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
128. Id. at 978.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 979-80.
131. No. 20-2148, 2021 WL 5198091 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2021).
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employment action. 3 2 After evaluating the evidence, the court concluded
that even if the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case and satisfy
McDonnell Douglas, she could not satisfy the additional but-for causation
standard imposed by the Court in Comcast.1 33 That interpretation is quite
unusual in light of the Supreme Court's and other courts' interpretation that
the McDonnell Douglas framework measures but-for causation. 13 4
Comcast's creation of asymmetry of causation standards for Title VII
and section 1981 poses a significant problem for courts when deciding how
to analyze claims on dispositive motions. Courts yearn to continue
conducting a uniform analysis of race claims under the two statutes, as they
did before Comcast, which seems reasonable because the same facts are the
basis for both claims. 35 However, given the different causation standards
required by Comcast, there no longer should be a uniform analysis. Title
VII claims should be evaluated under the mixed-motives framework,
incorporating motiving-factor causation, and section 1981 claims should be
evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework, if that
framework still measures but-for causation.' 36
Applying these different frameworks could result in a plaintiff's
satisfying the lower motivating factor standard and recovering under Title
VII for race discrimination, but failing to satisfy the more rigorous but-for
standard and not recovering under section 1981. That result would be a
change from the pre-Comcast law and would raise a significant issue
regarding the asymmetry of remedies between Title VII and section 1981.
Since the Court held that race discrimination plaintiffs could recover
damages under section 1981,137 race claims have enjoyed favored status
among the types of discrimination claims available under Title VII. That
favored status has remained intact, though reduced, even after the enactment
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 of section 1981a with its capped
compensatory and punitive damages.1 38 Congress enacted that law, in part,
132.
133.
134.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *10.
See supranote 120.

135.

See, e.g., Stovall v. ASRC Energy Servs.-Houston Contracting Co., No. 3:18-cv-00259-

TMB, 2021 WL 3361680, at *7 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 2021) ("Courts generally analyze Title VII and
Section 1981 claims the same, and 'facts sufficient to give rise to a Title VII claim are also sufficient for

a section 1981 claim."' (quoting Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987)));
Nelson v. Idleburg, No. 18 CV 2839, 2020 WL 2061555, at *9 (N.D. I1. Apr. 29, 2020) (on summary
judgment, analyzing Title V11 claim under pretext analysis and concluding that plaintiff could not
succeed under that standard or "the more stringent standard required for Section 1981").
136. 1 acknowledge the Court's unwillingness in Comcast to reaffirm that McDonnell Douglas
measures but-for causation. Before Comcast, the Court did so interpret the pretext framework.

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976).
137. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976).
138.

See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
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to put the other protected characteristics under Title VII on a closer to equal
footing with race by making damages and jury trials available under Title
VII. 139 However, section 1981a also expressly states that it does not limit
the scope of relief available under section 1981.140 Thus, the damages caps
of section 1981 a left race in the more favorable position regarding damages.
Now, it is arguable that race is in a worse position than the other protected
characteristics under Title VII because a plaintiff asserting a race claim
could lose under the but-for standard of section 1981141 and thus not recover
compensatory or punitive damages. In contrast, a plaintiff asserting a sex,
religion, or national origin claim under Title VII and section 1981a need
only prove her claim under the motivating factor standard to recover capped
damages.
If race discrimination plaintiffs begin prevailing on Title VII claims but
losing section 1981 claims, plaintiffs may choose to avoid the risk of losing
under section 1981's higher causation standard. They may forego a claim
under that law and instead assert a claim under only Title VII, seeking the
capped damages under section 1981 a so that the only standard of causation
is motivating factor. 4' However, whether section 1981a permits that
strategy remains unclear. When Congress enacted section 1981a as part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it was aware that race discrimination plaintiffs
could assert their claims under section 1981 and did not need the additional
statute. Presumably to prevent a windfall from duplication of recovery,
Congress included a provision stating that a plaintiff could recover damages
under section 1981a "provided that the complaining party cannot recover

139. See generally Levi, supra note 50, at 598 (stating "[w]hile § 1981 a took major steps to unify
the remedies among the federal civil rights statutes, the relief available and the process for obtaining
such relief remains more favorable under § 1981 and § 1983."); see also Zehrt, supra note 62, at 274
n.175 (recounting testimony before Congress on the inequality of remedies under the employment

discrimination laws). Section 1981a differs from section 1981 in that section 1981 creates a cause of
action independent of Title VII whereas section 1981a does not. Section 1981a is dependent on a

violation of Title VII. A plaintiff can sue for a violation of section 1981 without suing under Title VII,
but that is not true of section 1981 a. See, e.g., west v. Boeing Co., 851 F. Supp. 395, 400 n.7 (D. Kan.
1994).
140. 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(4).
141. This scenario is not based on wild speculation. See, e.g., Balkiewicz v. Wawa, Inc., Civ.
Action No., 20-2148, 2021 WL 5198091 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2021), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 131-34. After the Supreme Court decided Gross, many decisions referred to age discrimination
plaintiffs' inability to satisfy the more rigorous but-for causation standard. See, e.g., Arthur v. Pet Dairy,

593 F. App'x 211, 219 (4th Cir. 2015); Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
142. A plaintiff will need to make this decision early in a case and certainly before a judgment is
rendered. For at least two reasons, a plaintiff certainly could not assert a race claim under both Title VII
and section 1981, win the Title VII claim, lose the section 1981 claim, and then assert a claim under
1981a. First, section 1981a does not create a cause of action independent of Title VII. See supra note

139. Second, the facts on which a Title VII race claim and section 1981 claim are the same, so ajudgment
on the first race claim would be res judicata as to a subsequent race discrimination claim based on those

same facts.
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under section 1981."143 Does that provision permit or preclude a plaintiff
who does not assert an available claim under section 1981 from recovering
under section 1981a? Before the Comcast decision, this issue was rarely
presented because plaintiffs had no reason to forego a section 1981 claim.
With the emergence of the possibility that a plaintiff could win a race claim
under Title VII but lose under section 1981, courts may see plaintiffs bring
race discrimination claims under Title VII only, seeking capped damages
under section 1981a.144
Both plaintiffs and defendants now will have arguments regarding
whether the limiting language of section 1981a permits this result. On the
one hand, the plaintiff will argue that the language permits the claim
because, in fact, the plaintiff, having not asserted the section 1981 claim,
cannot recover damages under that section.1 4 5 Because the purpose of the
limiting language in section 1981 a is to prevent windfall,146 the plaintiff will
argue she is not seeking double recovery. A federal district court accepted
this argument in a pre-Comcastdecision.1 47 On the other hand, the defendant
will argue that Congress included the limiting language to preclude those
who have a claim under section 1981, whether they assert it or not, from
seeking damages under section 1981a. The defendant's position on this
issue seems more likely to prevail, but the result is uncertain. As one court
offering three possible interpretations of the limiting language commented,
48
It
"[t]his range of possibilities suggests that § 1981 is not well drafted."
body
of
employment
to
create
a
intended
Congress
seems implausible that
discrimination law in which plaintiffs would need to strategize under which
statute(s) to sue in order to achieve the best recovery.

143.

42 U.S.C. §1981a(a)(1).

144. Alternatively, plaintiffs may assert their race discrimination claims under only section 1981
and not Title VII. They may adopt this strategy if they think it is worth the challenge of proving but-for
causation under section 1981 with the prospect of uncapped damages in exchange for avoiding the samedecision defense that is available to defendants under part two of the mixed-motives framework for Title

VII claims. A defendant that establishes that defense significantly limits remedies, avoiding monetary
remedies and affirmative relief such as reinstatement or instatement. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
A strategy of race discrimination plaintiffs foregoing the Title VII claim would leave the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission out of the processing and attempted resolution of such claims.
That could not have been Congress's intent. I am grateful to Professor Rebecca White for making this

point.
145.

See Dunning v. Gen. Elec. Co., 892 F. Supp 1424, 1431 (M.D. Ala. 1995). The court cited

legislative history of section 1981a supporting the interpretation that relief is available under section
1981, thus precluding recovery under section 1981a only when it is actually awarded. Id.

146.

See, e.g., Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1110 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating

that "[t]his provision may do no more than bar double recovery").

147. Bradshaw v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 870 F. Supp. 406,408 (D. Me. 1992) (holding that "[s]imply
because [plaintiff] could have pled a claim for relief under § 1981, and did not, is no reason to bar his
claim for damages from going forth under § 1981 a").
148. Dunning v. General Elec. Co., 892 F. Supp. 1424, 1428 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
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Another issue stemming from the asymmetry of causation standards in
section 1981 and Title VII is jury instructions. When a plaintiff asserts Title
VII and section 1981 race discrimination claims, a court must give a jury a
motivating factor instruction for Title VII and a but-for instruction for
section 1981. Giving two different, complicated instructions on causation
applicable to the same set of facts risks juror confusion.1 49 Nonetheless, one
may think that juries, even if they do not fully understand jury instructions,
usually get the result right. However, the Supreme Court has expressed
concern about confusing jury instructions in employment discrimination
law. In Gross v. FBL FinancialServices,15 the Court majority expressed its
discontent with the mixed-motives analysis developed by the Court in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.'' The Court stated that in the aftermath of Price
Waterhouse, courts found articulating jury instructions that adequately
explain the burden-shifting framework to jurors to be difficult.' If the
Court was concerned with the difficulty of explaining how the burden of
persuasion shifts at stage two of the mixed-motives analysis, the Court
should be at least as concerned with trial courts crafting jury instructions
that adequately explain how the jury is to apply different standards of
causation to two different claims based on the same set of facts.
Overall, the cross-statute asymmetry the Court created for race
discrimination claims in its Comcast decision creates significant problems
with standards of causation, analysis of claims, and remedies. The ruling
puts plaintiffs and their attorneys in a quandary regarding litigation
strategy-how to plead and litigate their cases in order to effectuate the
maximum recovery. All of this seems contrary to the legislative history and
intent in view of the fact that in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Congress buttressed section 1981153 and bolstered the other types of
discrimination claims under Title VII and the ADA. Clearly, Congress
desired stronger vehicles for alleging and proving discrimination-not a
more convoluted manner of doing so. Therefore, Congress needs to correct
the asymmetry now permeating cross-statute race discrimination claims
under Title VII and section 1981.
149.

Jury instructions already are complicated enough in disparate treatment cases. See, e.g.,

Charles A. Sullivan, Making Too Much of Too Little?: Why "Motivating Factor" Liability Did Not
Revolutionize Title VII, 62 ARiz. L. REv. 357, 380-81 (2020); Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens:
DiscriminationLaw Through the Lens ofJury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 311 (2010); Kenneth

R. Davis, Price-Fixing:Refining the Price Waterhouse StandardandIndividualDisparateTreatment
Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 859, 901 (2004).
150. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
151. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
152. Gross, 557 U.S. at 179.
153. The 1991 Act overturned Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union,491 U.S. 164 (1989), in which
the Supreme Court held that section 1981 addressed issues of contract formation and enforcement but
not conduct of the employer after contract formation.
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B. The Frappied Decision andIntersectionalDiscriminationClaims
1. The Frappied Decision
In Frappiedv. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 5 4 the Tenth Circuit
held that plaintiffs could state a claim for discrimination on the basis of their
status as "older women." The court characterized the claim as a sex-plusage claim.1 55
In Frappied,a new casino owner laid off many of the former owner's
employees and then advertised to hire for open positions.' 5 6 Of the nine laid
5
The women
off plaintiffs, eight were women over the age of forty.'?
asserted disparate treatment and disparate impact claims under Title VII and
the ADEA.1 58 Among the claims were sex-plus-age disparate treatment and
disparate impact claims asserted under Title VII. The district court had
dismissed the sex-plus-age claims because it concluded that such claims
were not cognizable under Title VII,1 59 reasoning that the ADEA has a
narrower scope than Title VII.1 60 The court noted that plaintiffs also asserted
an age discrimination claim under the ADEA. Thus, it viewed the inclusion
of the sex-plus-age claim as a "spare bullet" under the broader scope of Title
VII if the plaintiffs failed to prove liability under the ADEA.161 The court
thought this was emphasized by the fact that the plaintiffs conceded that
they could not assert a successful sex discrimination claim under Title
VII.1 62 Additionally, the court raised the interesting issue of why the
plaintiffs should be able to "handpick" the statute under which they asserted
their sex-plus-age claim.' 63
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit observed that it is well-established that sexplus claims are cognizable under Title VII.4 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the viability of sex-plus claims in its landmark
decision Bostock v. Clayton County. 165 The Court's discussion of sex-plus
claims in Bostock, however, required the Tenth Circuit, which had
recognized sex-plus claims in the past, to revise its own conception of such
154.
155.
156.
3093326,
157.
158.
159.

966 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1047.
Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-cv-01294-RM-NYW, 2018 WL
at *1-2 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.

160.

By "scope," the court apparently was referring to the standard of causation because it cited

Gross. Id.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Frappied,966 F.3d at 1045 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 276 (1982)).
Id. (citing Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020)).
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claims. The Tenth Circuit previously required plaintiffs asserting sex-plus
claims to prove discrimination against an entire subclass, such as black
women. 166 The court found this conception of the sex-plus claim to be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's focus in Bostock on discrimination
against individuals, not groups. Thus, under the court's revised view, a sex67
plus plaintiff need not prove discrimination against her entire subclass.
The Tenth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court long ago
recognized the viability of a sex-plus claim for women with preschool
children, a scenario in which the plus characteristic is not even a protected
characteristic under any federal employment discrimination statute. 168 The
distinctive feature about the plaintiffs' sex-plus claim in Frappiedwas that
the plus characteristic was covered by a different federal employment
discrimination statute-the ADEA. Although no federal appellate court had
yet addressed that issue, some district courts 169 and the EEOC 170 had
recognized the viability of such claims. The Tenth Circuit then announced
that sex-plus claims are cognizable under Title VII. 17' Accordingly, the
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the sex-plus-age
claim.
The Frappiedcourt's holding does not seem remarkable because many
courts have recognized sex-plus discrimination claims. Moreover, several
courts, conceptualizing the claims as intersectional or hybrid discrimination
claims, 1 72 have recognized that plaintiffs have viable claims for combined
protected characteristics, such as discrimination against black women
(intersectionality of race and sex).1 73 As the Tenth Circuit recognized in
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1047.
168. Id. at 1046 (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam)).
Phillipswas the first decision of the Supreme Court addressing a Title vil issue.
169. See Frappied,966 F.3d at 1047 n.6 (citing cases).
170. Id. at 1047-48 (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 11A (Aug. 6, 2009) (stating that
"[i]ntersectional discrimination can involve more than one EEO statute, e.g., discrimination based on

age and disability, or based on sex and age").
171. Id. at 1048.
172. The term "intersectionality" was coined by Professor Kimberld Crenshaw, one of the
pioneers in theorizing such discrimination. Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of

Race and Sex: A BlackFeminist CritiqueofAntidiscriminationDoctrine, FeministTheory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 145 (1989); Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241
(1991). Professor Bradley Areheart traces the origins of "interacting inequalities" to earlier works. See
Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionalityand Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEORGE
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 199, 201 n.15 (2006).

173. Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980); Lam v.
Univ. ofHaw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir.1994); Harrington v. Cleburne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d
935, 937 (11th Cir. 2001); Shazor v. Pro. Transit Mgmt., Ltd., 744 F.3d 948, 957-58 (6th Cir. 2014);
Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2010); Kimble v. Wis. Dep't of
Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 769-71 (E.D. Wis. 2010); Westmoreland v. Prince George's
Cnty., Md., 876 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (D. Md. 2012).

2022]

CROSS-STATUTE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

1797

Frappied, however, it was the first circuit court of appeals to address
whether a sex-plus-age claim, characteristics covered by separate federal
employment discrimination statutes, is cognizable. Some district courts,
however, have declined to recognize intersectional discrimination claims
that cross over statutes 17 4 or specifically, age-plus claims. 7 5
Frappied may be characterized as a sex-plus claim, as the court
characterizes it, or as an intersectional or hybrid discrimination claim. The
terms overlap, but they are not synonymous. While sex-plus claims often
under
employment
characteristics
covered
combine
protected
discrimination cases, the plus characteristic in some cases is not another
protected characteristic,176 such as sex plus childcare responsibilities or sex
plus physical appearance. Intersectional claims necessarily combine
protected characteristics. For purposes of this Article, it is the intersectional
characterization of Frappiedthat is relevant,1 77 as the issue at hand is the
problems created by asymmetry across statutes.
2. Asymmetry Across Statutes CreatesProblemsfor Intersectional
DiscriminationClaims
Many courts have been receptive of intersectional discrimination claims
within Title VII, such as race-and-sex claims, but the reception has not been
universal. 178 Indeed, the standard bearer (and perhaps seminal decision) for
recognition of intersectional discrimination claims is Jeffries v. Harris
County Community Action Ass'n,1 79 which involved a claim of
discrimination against a black woman.1 80 Intersectional claims that cross
statutes, however, have not been accorded the same level of acceptance by
the courts. Moreover, sex-and-age claims, although approved by Frappied,
have not been approved by all courts.''

174. Chaikin v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Ill., No. 18-cv-1208, 2018 WL 4643016 (C.D. Ill. Sept.
27, 2018).
175. See Kayla King, Comment, Tenth Circuit Ruled in Favor of Sex-Plus-Age Claims of
Discrimination Under Title VII in the Wake of Bostock v. Clayton County, 62 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 11

185, 196 n.72 (2021) (citing cases).
176. See Marc Chase McAllister, Extending the Sex-Plus Discrimination Doctrine to Age
DiscriminationClaims Involving Multiple DiscriminatoryMotives, 60 B.C. L. REv. 469 (2019).
177. As Professor Areheart explains, treating a protected characteristic as a plus factor relegates
that characteristic to an inferior status. Such treatment ignores the principle that in intersectional claims,
each characteristic merits equal consideration. See Areheart, supranote 172, at 222.

178.
179.

See, e.g., id. at 214-15.
615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980). See Areheart, supra note 172, at 220 (discussing the

Fifth Circuit's "unflinching" recognition of sex-plus-race in Jefferies).

180.

See Alice Abrokwa, "When they Enter, We All Enter": Opening the Doorto Intersectional

DiscriminationClaims Based on Race andDisability, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 15, 48 (2018).
181. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 176, at 488-93; White, supra note 7, at 1331-38.
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Even though courts approving the cross-statute claims often cite as
support the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp.,1 82 as the Tenth Circuit did in Frappied,183 Phillips was a 1971
decision. Some recent decisions rejecting sex-plus-age claims have noted
the different causation standards applicable under Title VII and the ADEA
after the Court's more recent 2009 decision in Gross.1 84 For courts that
permit the claims, most view them as a sex-plus-age claims under Title VII,
as in Frappied, and permit the plaintiff to proceed under the motivating
factor standard and circumvent the more rigorous but-for standard of the
ADEA.' 85 On the other hand, some courts have explained that characterizing
such claims as age-plus-sex under the ADEA presents another causation
problem as plaintiffs would be arguing for two but-for causes.1 86 The latter
rationale should have been effectively repudiated, however, by the Supreme
Court in Bostock, as it explained that there can be more than one but-for
cause. 187 Further highlighting the uncertainties and inconsistencies
regarding cross-statute claims, the same judge that recognized a sex-plusage claim in Bauers-Toy v. Clarence Central School District,1 88 rejected an
age-plus-disability claim in Kelly v. Drexel University.1 89 No reported
decision appears to have considered the viability of intersectional claims
under Title VII and the ADA, such as race-and-disability.' 90
Courts also generally reject intersectional claims asserted under Title VII
and section 1981 because section 1981 is limited to race and does not
provide protection for any of the other characteristics protected under Title
VII.191 However, the rationale that section 1981 covers only race' 92 is no
more persuasive than arguing that age claims cannot be brought under Title
VII because Title VII does not cover age. Moreover, under the Supreme

182.
183.

400 U.S. 542 (1971).
Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (10th Cir. 2020).

184.

See Joann Song McLaughlin,

Limited Recourse for Older

Women's Intersectional

Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 26 ELDER L.J. 287, 307-08 (2019)
(citing Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., No.: 3:08-4132-JFA-PJG, 2010 WL 1052082 (D.S.C. Mar. 22,
2010); DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572 (E.D. Pa. 2010)). See generally White, supra
note 7, at 1336-37 (noting that reliance on Phillips v. Martin Marietta has been called into question by
Gross).

185. Bauers-Toy v. Clarence Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-845, 2015 WL 13574291 at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015).
186. Id. at *6.
187. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020).
188. Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291.
189. 907 F. Supp. 864, 875 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996).
190. See Abrokwa, supra note 180, at 18.
191. A court rejected the intersectional claim of a black woman in McCowan v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 19-3326-KSM, 2021 WL 84013, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2021).
192. See id.
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Court's broad interpretation of race in St. FrancisCollege v. Al-Khazraji,1 93
intersectional claims could come within the definition of race.
Although some intersectional claims fare better than others, on the
whole, intersectional claims do not fare well in the courts.1 94 Yet,
intersectional claims appear to be asserted with increasing frequency.' 95
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit in Frappied found support for the
intersectional claim it recognized in the Supreme Court's landmark decision
in Bostock. The court noted that in Bostock the Supreme Court stated that if
sex plays a role in the employer's decision, the employer does not avoid
liability by proving that some other factor "'might also be at work,"' even
if that other factor plays a more important role than sex.' 96 If the Tenth
Circuit was correct in its interpretation, and I think it was, there now is a
tension between Phillips and Bostock on the one hand and Gross on the
other.
The district court in Frappiednoted the different causation standards
under the ADEA and Title VII. Although other courts have permitted sexplus-age claims under Title VII, which would invoke the lower motivating
factor causation standard, the Frappieddistrict court queried why plaintiffs
"should be able to handpick the statute under which" their intersectional
claims are governed.1 97 The district court thereby posed a perceptive
inquiry. Although the Tenth Circuit characterized the plaintiffs' claim as a
sex-plus-age claim under Title VII, it is not obvious why that is a better
characterization than age-plus-sex under the ADEA. An equally reasonable
interpretation of the law is that a plaintiff should have to satisfy the more
stringent causation standard implicated in an intersectional claim.
In addition to the issues regarding causation standards, something else
vexes courts about intersectional discrimination claims. Some courts are
troubled by the notion that the discrimination the plaintiffs are alleging does
not fit the structure of separate statutes created by Congress.1 98 For example,

193.

481 U.S. 604, 607 (1987). See also Abdullahi v. Prada USA Corp., 520 F.3d 710, 712 (7th

Cir. 2008) (stating that a loose sense of race is the correct interpretation of a statute passed in 1866).
194. See Nicole Delaney & Joanna N. Lahey, The ADEA at the Intersection ofAge and Race, 40
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 61, 79 (2019); Rachel Kahn Best, Lauren B. Edelman, Linda Hamilton

Krieger & Scott R. Eliason, Multiple Disadvantages:An EmpiricalTest ofIntersectionality Theory in
EEO Litigation,45 L. & SOC'Y REV. 991, 995 (2011).
195.

Delaney & Lahey, supranote 194, at 81 n.148. Professor Rebecca White discussed the need

for recognition of sex-plus-age claims in light of the prevalence ofdiscrimination against older women.
See White, supra note 7, at 1327-29. Professor White used the example of widespread allegations of
discrimination against older female television news anchors. See id.

196. Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1046 (10th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1744 (2020)).
197. Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-01294-RM-NYW, 2018 WL
3093326, at *3 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018).
198. See Delaney & Lahey, supra note 194, at 83; White, supranote 7, at 1334-35.
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the district courts in Johnson v. Napolitano 99 and Luce v. Dalton200 rejected
intersectional claims in part because Congress did not create an employment
discrimination "super statute" covering all protected characteristics.20' The
Luce court stated that permitting such a blending "would amount to judicial
legislation."202 Expressing a similar view that the discrimination alleged
must fit within the structure of separate statutes enacted by Congress, the
court in Chaikin v. Methodist Medical Center of Illinois203 rejected the
intersectional claim of the plaintiff who alleged that his employer
discriminated against him as a "crazy, old Russian." The court said it had
seen intersectional claims of discrimination under a single statute advance
in federal courts. However, the claim of the plaintiff sought to "transmogrify
several different statutes into a new superseding legal cause of action."2 04
The reluctance of the courts to recognize claims crossing over statutes and
the coverage of the various protected characteristics under separate statutes
reflect a view of employment discrimination that is one dimensional and
categorical. 20s The courts see the separate statutes with different governing
principles and decide, not unreasonably, that Congress intended such a
disjointed and incoherent approach.
Related to the idea that intersectional discrimination plaintiffs are not
conforming to the structure of the statutes is the idea that some plaintiffs
who assert tenuous single-characteristic discrimination claims hope to
bolster them with the hybrid claims. 206 For example, the district court in
Frappied, while not labeling the plaintiffs' age discrimination claim
"weak," opined that the sex-plus-age claim was "effectively an attempt to
have a spare bullet in plaintiffs' chamber" in the event the age claim
failed. 207 The court undoubtedly is correct that the plaintiffs adopted a
strategy of presenting claims in a way that maximized their potential for
recovery. However, such strategizing by plaintiffs is not indicative of the
weakness of their claims; rather, it demonstrates their cognizance of the
asymmetries of federal employment discrimination law in which claims
based on different protected characteristics are not treated the same.

199.
200.
201.

1285164,
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

No. 10 Civ. 8545(ALC), 2013 WL 1285164, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013).
166 F.R.D. 457, 461 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 167 F.R.D. 88 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 461; Napolitano, 2013 W L

at *9.
Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 461.
No. 18-cv-1208, 2018 WL 4643016, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2018).
Id.
See Best et al., supra note 194, at 994-95.
See, e.g., Delaney & Lahey, supra note 194, at 80-81.

207. Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-ev-01294-RM-NYW, 2018 WL
3093326, at *3 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018), affd in part, rev'd in partand remanded, 966 F.3d 1038 (10th
Cir. 2020).
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Frappied is a landmark decision in that a federal appellate court
recognized that a discrimination claim that crosses statutes is actionable
under federal employment discrimination law. 208 The decision does not,
however, adequately address the important questions of which standard of
causation applies and which remedies are available under the asymmetrical
law of Title VII and the ADEA; rather, it assumes, without discussing, that
the claim is governed by Title VII. I submit that there is no good answer to
these questions in a legal regime with separate statutes covering various
protected characteristics and asymmetrical law governing fundamental
issues such as causation and remedies.
III. IT IS TIME FOR A SUPER STATUTE

For far too long, Congress has permitted federal employment
discrimination law to develop asymmetrically under Title VII, section 1981,
the ADEA, and the ADA. The asymmetrical law creates many practical and
theoretical problems and makes employment discrimination law difficult to
understand and/or trust for many people. 209 Cross-statute claims of
discrimination demonstrate the vexatious nature of this asymmetry. 21 0
Before the Supreme Court began interpreting the causation standards
under the statutes as different, there were no significant problems with race
discrimination claims asserted under both Title VII and section 1981.
Similarly, intersectional discrimination claims crossing over Title VII and
the ADEA or other claims involving combinations did not present problems
of causation, although the different remedies under Title VII and the ADA
on the one hand, and the ADEA on the other should have posed a problem

208.

Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 2020).

209. Consider, for example, the consternation of many people upon learning from the Supreme
Court's decision in Gross that plaintiffs asserting age discrimination claims must satisfy a more stringent

causation standard than plaintiffs asserting claims under Title VII. See, e.g., Kenneth Terrell, AARP
Urges Congress to Strengthen Age Discrimination Laws, AARP (May
21,
https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-2019/powada-age-discrimination.html

2019),

[https://perma.cc/G7UH-5HKS]; AARP, AARP Poll:ProtectingOlder Workers Against Discrimination
Act
National
Public
Opinion
Poll,
GS
STRATEGY
GRP.
(June
2012),
https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll/study/31086265; Patricia Barnes, Finally, U.S. House Will Address
Disastrous U.S. Supreme Court Ruling on Age Discrimination, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2020, 1:16 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/patriciagbarnes/2020/01/13/finally-us-house-will-address-disastrous-us-

[https://perma.cc/D9DY-D7QS];
supreme-court-ruling-on-age-discrimination/?sh=7521da8d5efd
Editorial,
Age
Discrimination,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
6,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/opinion/07tue2.html [https://perma.cc/AU9X-XRUW] (calling
for Congress to overturn Gross).
210. There are problems of asymmetry beyond those revealed by cross-statute claims. See, e.g.,
Corbett, IntolerableAsymmetry, supra note 21, at 18, passim.
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for courts to resolve. 21 Now, after the Supreme Court's causation decisions,
the problems with Title VII-section 1981 claims and intersectional
discrimination claims are more pronounced, and they demand attention. The
Supreme Court cannot unilaterally fix the asymmetry for a couple of
reasons. First, the Court will not overturn its decisions interpreting "because
of' to mean but-for causation and disallowing the mixed-motives analysis
212
2 t3
-Comcast. 2 a
-Nassar
for statutes requiring but-for causation-Gross
Second, the Court cannot make the remedies provisions uniform across
statutes because of Congress's express statutory language.
Therefore, reforming employment discrimination law to eliminate or
reduce the problems of asymmetry is a job for Congress. However,
Congress should not follow its familiar "playbook" of simply amending the
statutes in a way that overturns Supreme Court decisions with which
Congress disagrees. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 demonstrates the folly of
that approach. 215 Instead, the time has come for Congress to enact a single
"super statute" for employment discrimination. That is the approach that
Parliament took in reforming the employment discrimination law of the
United Kingdom in the Equality Act of 2010,216 which consolidated nine
pieces of employment discrimination law into one. 2 17 Additionally, many
state employment discrimination laws in the United States are omnibus
"super statutes." 218
I have argued before for Congress to undertake a holistic reform of
employment discrimination law. 2 19 Over the past decade or so, the need has
become even more acute with the increasing asymmetry across the statutes
and the difficulties posed by employment discrimination claims that cross

211.

Not all courts perceived this to be a problem. For example, the Tenth Circuit in Frappied

treated the sex-plus-age claim as a Title VII claim. As discussed above, this should have been a debatable
issue. See supratext accompanying and following note 197.

212. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
213. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
214. Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
215. See Corbett, IntolerableAsymmetry, supra note 21.
216. Equality Act of 2010, supranote 27.
217. The nine consolidated pieces of legislation were the Equal Pay Act of 1970, the Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975, the Disability Discrimination Act of 1995, the Employment Equality
(Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003,
the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, the Equality Act 2006, Part 2, and the Equality Act
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007. See What Is the Equality Act, EQUAL. & HUM. RTS. COMM'N
(June

19,

2019),

https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/equality-act-2010/what-equality-act

[https://perma.cc/PBF7-X9CZ].
218. See, e.g., Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, LA. STAT. ANN.

§

23:301 (1997);

Employment Discrimination Law, MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (2011); Arizona
Employment Discrimination Law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (2021); Oklahoma Employment
Montana

Discrimination Law, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (West 2011); Tennessee Employment
Discrimination Law, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-401 (West 2017).
219. See Corbett, Callingon Congress, supranote 25.

2022]

CROSS-STATUTE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

1803

over statutes. The Tenth Circuit was correct in Frappiedthat the Supreme
Court's Bostock decision, while not directly on point, lends support for such
cross-statute claims. 220 The different remedies across the statutes is not a
new problem. Rather, the different causation standards have become a more
significant problem after the Supreme Court's Gross-Nassar-Comcastline
of decisions. If the Tenth Circuit was correct about the ramifications of
Bostock, there is an undeniable tension between Gross-Nassar-Comcaston
the one hand and Bostock on the other.
If Congress were to repeal the existing employment discrimination
statutes and enact a consolidated statute, it could address all of the problems
created by asymmetry. A super-statute would enable Congress to achieve as
much uniformity as it is willing to accept. Ideally, there would be one
standard of causation for all protected characteristics, one set of remedies,
and a recognition of the viability of intersectional claims among the
characteristics covered in the statute. Congress could, however, make
distinctions within the single statute if it chose to do so, favoring one or
more protected characteristics over others. If, for example, Congress did
intend to have a more stringent standard of causation for proof of age
discrimination claims than for race, color, religion, sex, and national origin,
as the Supreme Court interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in Gross,
Congress could so specify in the statute. If there were different standards of
causation, Congress also could specify how an intersectional claim,-if
recognized, consisting of characteristics with different standards, is to be
addressed-whether it would require satisfaction of the higher standard or
the lower standard.
In the single statute, Congress could specify whether intersectional
claims are permitted or not. On this point, I urge Congress not to follow the
path of the United Kingdom. The Equality Act of 2010 includes a provision,
section 14,221 proscribing what it calls "combined discrimination: dual
characteristics," which never went into effect. 222 Section 14 limited a claim
to "a combination of two relevant protected characteristics": age, disability,
gender reassignment, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. 2 23
The government of the United Kingdom determined that not bringing that
section into force would be a way to reduce the cost of regulation for

220.
2020).
221.

See Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1045-47 (10th Cir.
Equality Act of 2010, supranote 27.

See Catherine Borne, Falling Between the Cracks-Is It Time to Legislate for Dual
Discrimination?
KINGSLEY
NAPLEY
(Mar.
10,
2020),
https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/insights/blogs/employment-law-blog/falling-between-the-cracks-is222.

it-time-to-legislate-for-dual-discrimination#page=l [https://perma.cc/97W9-LBZM].
223. Equality Act of 2010, supranote 27.
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businesses. 2 24 By not bringing that statutory section into force, the
government left the decision on the permissibility of intersectional claims
to the case law, which has been generally receptive of the claims. 225
Congress should instead take the path of affirmatively addressing the
permissibility of intersectional claims in the super statute, and I think it
226
should permit claims that combine more than two characteristics.
Regarding remedies, Congress should recognize uniform remedies
among all covered characteristics. If Congress wanted to make different
remedies available depending on whether a plaintiff proved a higher or
lower level of causation, 22 7 it could do that. Nonetheless, if Congress chose,
as the uniform remedies, the remedies of Title VII and section 1981, there
would be no reason for plaintiffs to assert race discrimination claims under
both Title VII and section 1981.
Turning to other current issues, Congress could consider whether the law
should be symmetrical among the protected characteristics. Should the bona
fide occupational qualification defense be expanded to apply to race, color,
and disability? 228 Should the theory of failure to reasonably accommodate
be maintained for religion, disability, and pregnancy (per Young), 229
extended to other protected characteristics, or contracted? Also, what would
Congress do with the application of the theory of associational or relational
discrimination, which is expressly recognized by statute in the ADA 230 and
recognized in the case law for race and other protected characteristics?2
These and other asymmetries could be maintained or eliminated. Examining
the whole of employment discrimination law and reforming it involves
many difficult choices, but the reform is worthwhile and much needed.
224. See What Is the EqualityAct, supra note 217; Borne, supranote 222.
225. See Borne, supranote 222.
226. Professor Areheart recommended that Congress amend Title vil, adding to the list of
protected characteristics "or any combination thereof." See Areheart, supra note 172, at 234. That
amendment would provide Congressional recognition of intersectional claims for characteristics covered
by Title VII, but it would not recognize cross-statute intersectional claims. A super statute is the

preferable solution.
227. This occurs, for example, with the mixed-motives analysis in Title V11 with its motivating
factor standard and limitation of remedies for defendants who disprove but-for causation under the same-

decision defense. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). A similar result pertains in the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal-sector provision of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) in
Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020).
228. Currently, Title VII recognized the BFOQ defense for sex, national origin, and religion, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1), and the ADEA recognizes it for age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). The ADA provides
for a different defense-the direct threat defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). The direct threat defense
differs from the BFOQ defense because BFOQ permits employers to make categorical judgments,
whereas direct threat requires individualized inquiry. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1490 (2001).

229. See supra note 95; Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
231. See, e.g., Ellis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 523 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2008); victoria Schwartz,
Title VII: A Shiftfrom Sex to Relationships,35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209 (2012).
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Congress should enact a super employment discrimination statute with
the goal of providing a high degree of symmetry in employment
discrimination law, thus eliminating problems of cross-statute claims. I do
not mean to suggest that undertaking the reform of employment
discrimination law is simple or noncontroversial-a holistic reform of this
type would be extremely controversial, particularly in the current polarized
political climate.232 Nonetheless, our employment discrimination law is
almost sixty years old and in need of such reform.
There is a final concern more alarming than the prospect of hard work
and the difficulty of cooperation in the current political environment:
beyond potentially futile attempts to enact a super employment
discrimination statute, a greater concern is that a consolidated statute would
be enacted that strips protections that exist in the current regime.2 33
Although enactment of a less protective statute is a valid concern, I think it
is an unlikely result. More likely results are the failure of the project and
continuation of the current regime or enactment of a single statute, resulting
from compromises, that is better than what exists today. In that consolidated
statute, perhaps age discrimination plaintiffs no longer would have available
liquidated damages for willful violations, but they may have a lower
standard of causation and the remedies currently available under Title VII
and section 1981 a or section 1981. Consider, for example, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 and its failed precursor in 1990. Political compromise regarding
the 1991 Act brought about capped damages for Title VII and ADA
claims. 234 The result was not the equalization of other Title VII and ADA
claims with race claims, which the failed 1990 Act would have brought
about, but rather, the disparity was lessened. The compromise in the 1991
Act may not have produced the best law, but the result was better than what
we had before. 2 35
The current asymmetry and uncertainty burden and confuse both
employers and employees, so there should be incentive enough for
advocates on both sides and those in the middle to work together to craft a

232. See, e.g., Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological
Uniformity and PartisanAntipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(June

12,

2014),

https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-

american-public/ [https://perma.cc/4NXZ-MQ4N].
233.
234.
235.

Professor Charles Sullivan urged this point, and I am grateful to him.
See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
Another example that gives reason for guarded optimism is Congress's enactment of the

ADA Amendments Act of 2008, the purpose of which was to strengthen the ADA of 1990, under which
plaintiffs lost a breathtakingly high percentage of claims because of courts' restrictive interpretations of
the statute. See generally Stephen F. Befort, An EmpiricalExamination of Case Outcomes Under the
ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2027 (2013); Bradley A. Areheart, Disability Trouble,

29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 347 (2011); James Concannon, Mind Matters: Mental Disabilityand the
Historyand Futureofthe Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 36 L. & PSYCH. REV. 89 (2012).
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consolidated statute. At a minimum, the effort should bring about careful
consideration of a body of law that has developed haphazardly for almost
six decades, which is worthwhile in itself. That consideration and
recognition of the asymmetrical state of the law should result in some
needed improvement. The time has come for an employment discrimination
super statute.
CONCLUSION

Asymmetry of the employment discrimination law regarding the various
protected characteristics in Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA has made the
law unnecessarily complicated and inscrutable. Why is it harder to prove
age discrimination than race or sex discrimination? Why are the remedies
different for age discrimination than for race, sex, religion, national origin,
or disability discrimination? Why can race discrimination plaintiffs recover
better remedies than sex discrimination plaintiffs? Why must race
discrimination plaintiffs prove but-for causation to recover compensatory
and/or punitive damages, but plaintiffs claiming sex, religion, or national
origin discrimination can recover compensatory and/or punitive damages by
proving motivating factor? The Supreme Court's decisions of the past
decade on standards of causation in employment discrimination have
exacerbated the problems of asymmetry. These problems come into clearest
focus in cross-statute claims, such as race claims under Title VII/section
1981 and intersectional claims.
The problems of asymmetry are a product of Congress's initially
enacting separate statutes and following up with piecemeal amendments to
those employment discrimination statutes and the Supreme Court
interpreting those amendments. The solution is for Congress to enact an
employment discrimination super statute with the goal of achieving
uniformity. Six decades into the employment discrimination project, we
need a less discriminatory employment discrimination law.

